Rehabilitating Introspection (pdf-10 pp)
A Procedure for a First Person Psychical Science

Abstract: In this paper I argue that the lack of progress in developing a science of the mind is not because a mind can not be objectively observed, but rather because human minds are highly individualized. I then propose a procedure for addressing this individualization problem and offer a number of insights based on what are presumed to be intersubjectively reproducible features of my own mind.

Feelings of Worthlessness (pdf-10 pp)
An Annotated Outline of a Theory of Emotional Instability

Abstract: In this paper I outline a theory of ego/ self-worth related emotion based on the premise that 'feelings of worthlessness' are a maladaptive byproduct of the evolution of rationality.

Rationology 101 (pdf-9 pp)

Abstract: It is often taken as a given that rationality is a matter of adjudicating means to ends (e.g., Hume). Based on the premise that 'feelings of worthlessness' are a maladaptive byproduct of the evolution of rationality, I forego this convention by proposing a theory of rationality that encompasses the rationality of ends. One of the more interesting implications of this approach is that the moral maxim, 'love (intrinsically value) your neighbor as yourself' can be construed as an imperative of an implicit theory of rationality in which 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being objective', not only cognitively, but valuatively as well (impartiality). Furthermore, by demonstrating how this implicit theory can address various rationality paradoxes (rational irrationality, epistemic vs. practical rationality conflict, the "rationality debate" [Cohen vs. Tversky and Kahneman], the Prisoners' Dilemma, etc.), its epistemic credentials can be shown to surpass those of competing theories such as the means/end theory, rational choice theory, egoism, utilitarianism, the "standard picture", etc. In the final section of the paper I employ some of these insights to derive a moral 'ought' from an epistemic 'is'.

Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk
(Instead of Mr. Spock) (pdf-10 pp)
The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism

Abstract: Based on Hume's observations on how association "facilitates the sympathy", I offer an alternative to the various adaptionist accounts of human benevolence (kin selection, reciprocal altruism, group selection, etc.) in a natural world presumed to favor selfishness. In this scenario, the cumulative effect of Hume's logic over millennia of linguistic and cultural evolution has become sufficient to have overwhelmed nature's incessant culling of the valuatively unfit (benevolent individuals). Although less than optimal, the resulting valuative profile has been "tolerated" by natural selection as a necessary premium for reaping the adaptive rewards that attend a rational species. Paradoxically, this would also entail the intriguing implication we have become less determined (conatively/ valuatively) by natural selection as a result of natural selection.

Being Rational (pdf-12 pp)
Abstract: Based on a simple premise and relying on the metaphor of vision, I offer an alternative to the "standard picture" of rationality in which 'being rational' is construed as simply a matter of conforming to established rules of inference. In addition to offering a means of visualizing a number of features commonly associated with rationality including correspondence, coherence, incompleteness, justification and irrationality, I also explain how my alternative to the "standard picture" can provide solutions to the Gettier problem, the "rationality debate" (Stein) and "the central theoretical problem of sociobiology" (Wilson).

Dismantling the Guillotine (pdf-10 pp)

Abstract: Aside from the mind body problem, there is perhaps no more infamous philosophical perplexity than 'Hume's Guillotine', i.e., the purported logical gap between 'is' (factual/ descriptive) premises and 'ought' (normative/ prescriptive) conclusions. Based on the premise that our prescriptive 'ought's are actually referencing a shared implicit (e.g., subconscious) theory of rationality and my own proposed procedure for deciphering some of its parameters, I offer a derivation of a moral prescriptive 'ought' ('love thy neighbor') from a descriptive 'is' (an implicit theory of rationality that is demonstrably "true") on the grounds that the concept/ attribute of rationality is the fount from which practical normativity flows. I also offer an explanation for why we, as quasi rational naturally selected organisms, experience and often respond to the tug of this moral maxim ('love thy neighbor'), including those occasions that fall wildly outside of the parameters predicted by inclusive fitness theory (Mother Teresa, self-endangering Greenpeacers, self-incinerating Buddhist monks, etc.).